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16 May 1961


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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN





16 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
DAILY BRIEF

*South Korea: (Information available as of 0500 EDT)
The only military units thus far identified with the military coup staged in Seoul in the early morning hours of 16 May are elements of the South Korean Second Army and some marine units. The rest of the army, the air force, and most navy elements reportedly have not thus far participate in the revolutionary activity; which way they will throw their support is not clear. Although the "military revolutionary committee" set up shortly after the coup claims that it controls the entire country, and evidently does control the city of Seoul, and possibly Taegu, it is still questionable whether the coup leaders have sufficient support to retain power.

The "military revolutionary committee," which claims to be anti-Communist, pro-US, and pro-UN, has been issuing proclamations over the name of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong. Early on 16 May Chang asked the commander of UN forces in Korea, US General Magruder, for the assistance of American forces in putting down the revolt, and the revolt leaders may be merely using his name. Chang has, however, since been in contact with the coup leaders, and his present position is not known; it is possible he is working for a compromise which would avoid further armed conflict. In any event, the real leader and chief planner of the coup appears to be Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of the Second Army, who was reported last month to be planning a coup. The whereabouts of Prime Minister Chang Myon is not known; but he apparently escaped when the coup leaders tried to capture him and is now in hiding. According to press reports, a number of other government officials are under house arrest in Seoul.

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16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

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delete *Laos: Tripartite talks at Namone between the Boun Oum government, the Souvanna group, and the Pathet Lao continue last Pof to be inconclusive. The third session of 15 May broke up without agreement on the agenda, with the Pathet Lao continuing to insist that political matters be placed high on the agenda ok classifica and the government urging that detailed cease-fire arrangetion laked ments be discussed first. The next meeting is scheduled for n a sentence 17 May, with another to follow on 19 May? The military situation in the major operational areas re-hat was

The military situation in the major operational areas remained during mains quiet, although the progovernment Meo guerrilla base removed during at Pa Dong is still under enemy artillery harassment.

Airlift operations were scheduled through 16 May.

(Backup, Page 3) (Map)

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20 "nonaligned" conthe UAR and Yugos izing the conference be convened in Cair India ar suing invitations to agenda, time, and Nehru, under prese participate, at least strong reservations. Aside from the promitted and committed conference will be	ference: Plans for a conferent intries are now taking definition lay governments—prime more—proposing that a preparation on 5 June. Independent of June and Indonesia are being asked this meeting, which will complace of a neutralist summit sure from Nasir and Tito, has in the preparatory meeting a shout the value of such a comblem of differentiating between the sure primarily as a forum for the would intensify rather than the sure of t	te form, with vers in organ- torv meeting to join in is- nsider the conference. as agreed to g, but has onference. een uncom- ned that the or anticolo-
governmental relatively smooth, and continues. Nasir i attack by ordering put. Over the past adverse treatment decrease in UAR cr. (Backup, Iman: The Sha	reportedly attact a socialist state but at the satisfication with the UAR factor of the international Community of the two countries of the unit of the Uarress and radio, it is in the Uarress and radio, it is in the Uarress and radio, it is in the United States. The international Community of the Uarress and radio, it is in the United States. The international Community of the Uarress and radio, it is in the United States. The international Community of the United States. The international Community of the United States. The international Community of the United States of the United States. The international Community of the United States of the United States. The international Community of the United States of the	ame time jail- sir did not un- ism." While last H from time to hist press, es are rela- aid to the UAR d to Khrushchev's propaganda out- as received some with a marked passador that
necessary and that	he will support them. Never power in Iran has traditional DAILY BRIEF	ertheless, he
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the Crown and must continue to do so. He added that he would abdicate rather than become a figurehead being told what to do and say by successive governments. The Shah is still scheduled to leave on 17 May for an official visit to Norway, but plans to return directly to Iran rather than vacation elsewhere in Europe as originally scheduled (Backup, Page 8)

Morocco: King Hassan II is continuing maneuvers to concentrate power and government administration into his own hands. Apparently enthusiastic crowds during his recent official visits to major cities seem to have convinced Hassan that he can rule without political parties. Most major political factions, however, are becoming bolder in their attacks on the King's personal rule. They will probably resent the appointment of a new cabinet—which is said to be imminent—if, as reliably reported, Hassan chooses only nonpolitical technicians loyal to him. The King is aware of this political opposition, and some evidence suggests he is planning to initiate strict police and military controls in the major cities of Morocco (Backup, Page 9)

West Germany: West German and West Berlin party leaders are reported considering holding a meeting of the Bundesrat —the upper house of the West German parliament—in West Berlin, possibly on 16 June, the eve of the "Day of German Unity" which commemorates the East Berlin uprisings of 17 June 1953. Khrushchev told the West German ambassador on 24 April that the bloc would be willing to postpone the conclusion of a separate peace treaty provided the West made no "unexpected moves," presumably such as a parliamentary meeting in Berlin. It is doubtful, however, that a Bundesrat meeting would materially alter the timing of Soviet moves regarding Berlin. The intensity of likely Soviet protests would depend to some extent on the possibility of a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy.

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*USSR-Nuclear Test Ban Conference: The formal Soviet statement at Geneva on 15 May warning that further French nuclear testing will make a test ban agreement "impossible" and "may compel" the USSR to resume testing, appears designed to divert attention from control issues. The long delay in reacting to the French test of 25 April suggests that the Soviet leaders hope to inflate the question of French testing into a major point in the discussions between President Kennedy and De Gaulle. By repeating previous charges that the French have tested in order to perfect weapons for the benefit of NATO and thereby gain "unilateral advantages" for the West, Moscow apparently hopes to minimize recent Western concessions and create the impression that the West has not negotiated seriously.

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South Korea

Major General Pak Chong-hui was court-martialed in 1948 on charges of being a Communist and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, he was recalled to service, and subsequently was pardoned because of his war record. He is not known to have re-established contacts with the Communists or to have been connected with South Korean leftist groups since 1948. However, because of alleged efforts to stir up discontent among officer elements following the revolt which toppled Rhee in April 1960, there was some question of his loyalty and whether he would soon be dropped from the Army.

The South Korean Second Army is largely composed of training and logistical units. It is not known whether units of the First Army--South Korea's combat ready force deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea--support the uprising. First Army support for the coup could ensure its success. Although a proclamation of the "revolutionary committee" has named the First Army commanding general Yi Han-lim as "martial law commander" in the front line areas, Yi is reliably reported to be against the coup.

In a six point proclamation the insurgents, who have proclaimed martial law, have announced that they intend to strengthen anti-Communist measures, observe the UN charter, wipe out government corruption, rehabilitate the economy, work for Korean unification, and eventially return the government to civilian authority when their mission is accomplished. However, according to the reports of last month, Pak and his supporters had no definite plans for administering the government after they seized power. There also were indications that the Pak group was discontented over the loss of the privileged position enjoyed by the military under the Rhee regime. In the year since Rhee's ouster, many senior officers have been cashiered from the service, a civilian committee has been set up to investigate military affairs, and the press has been permitted to criticise the armed forces.

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong was one of those widely criticized in the press for his support of the Rhee regime and accused of acquiring an illegal fortune through

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graft and corruption. Chang knew that Pak was planning a coup, but claimed last month that he lacked sufficient evidence to arrest the plotters. It is possible that Chang now may be playing both sides of the fence in an effort to assure his position whatever the outcome.

day's events in South Korea. The only Communist bloc reaction noted thus far has been a Moscow TASS item, and this essentially was a repeat of American press reports.	3

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	Situation in Laos
	of three aircraft may have been involved in airlift operations. Two of theseSoviet LI-2swere scheduled for Xieng Khouar but were not actually reflected in flight. Flights scheduled for 15 May indicate a resumption of nearly normal airlift activity after a two-day lull on 13 and 14 May. The Soviet AN-12 en route to North Vietnam from the USSR left Canton and arrived at Haiphong on 15 May.
	The Communist Chinese have rebroadcast Pathet Lao charges of 15 May that some South Vietnamese forces have crossed into Laotian territory. This is the first Communist bloc reaction to the 4 May movement of South Vietnamese special forces to a point several miles inside Laos along Rout 9. The Peiping broadcast avoids any direct threat of retaliatory action but charges that recent South Vietnamese and Thai troop movements are aimed at sabotaging a peaceful settlement in Laos?
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Preparations for Neutralist Conference

Nehru's initial reaction to the Tito-Nasir initiative, which took the form of a joint diplomatic note sent in mid-April to the heads of 17 Asian-African and four Latin American states, revealed considerable pique over being presented with a fait accompli. Nehru has long expressed the view that an ill-planned gathering of neutralist nations, either on a world-wide basis or limited to the Asian-African bloc, would merely dramatize the lack of agreement among these governments on various international questions and contribute little toward solving them. The Indian leader also is reluctant to encourage the formal establishment of any "third bloc" or alliance to offset the major power blocs, both because this would be inconsistent with New Delhi's strict adherence to a nonalignment policy and because it might lessen Nehru's prestige and freedom of action as an independent world leader.

In talks with UAR and Yugoslav representatives in New Delhi, Nehru immediately raised the problem of how to differentiate between uncommitted and committed nations and questioned the omission of certain neutralist European and African countries from the list of those to be invited.

Nehru expressed disapproval of the inclusion of Cuba, whose government he apparently feels is formally aligned with the "socialist" camp. New Delhi also fears that Cuba's presence would inject a strident anti-US note into the discussions which would merely heighten international tension and possibly also have a harmful effect on Indo-American relations.

The question of inviting European states to the summit conference, along with the question of what constitutes non-alignment, will probably be thrashed out at Cairo. Cairo's interpretation of nonalignment explain-

ing the criteria for the invitations to the Cairo meeting.

Each country invited was considered to have adopted and officially declared a policy of nonalignment and was not linked militarily to either major power bloc or to any one of the great powers. Cairo further stated it would be

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pleased to invite "any" country which was prepared to proclaim such a policy.

Indonesia is expected to co-sponsor the meeting, despite Djakarta's reported conviction that Nasir and Tito, in calling a "neutralist summit," have seized the initiative from President Sukarno, who has been urging a second Afro-Asian political conference for almost a year. Sukarno, midway on a global tour, arrives in Cairo on 16 May and presumably will clarify Indonesia's position.

In Latin America, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela have been invited; Brazilian Ambassador Thompson in Cairo reported to his Foreign Ministry on 9 May that "there is some thought of inviting Ecuador and Bolivia also." None of the Latin Americans has clearly accepted. Cuban Foreign Minister Roa apparently rebuked the Cuban Embassy in Cairo as a result of a UPI report that a spokesman for that embassy had announced Castro would attend. Roa instructed the embassy to clarify that the embassy has not received official notice in this respect.

Brazilian President Quadros is apparently pursu	ing an
equivocal course.	of -
ficials in Belgrade and Cairo have indicated that Qua	dros
has accepted, and the Cuban press reports that he re	ecently
told a spokesman of the visiting Sukarno entourage th	ıat
Brazil would attend. However, the Brazilian foreign	minis-
ter denied the acceptance to US Ambassador Cabot.	

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Khrushchev Criticizes UAR Policies	
Nasir cannot prevent Egyptians fr and that "what you are doing will lead will be overthrown just like you over	l to revolution and you
	Khrushchev said,
"Everybody knows that UAR neutrality a nation of corruption." Such remark by Khrushchev during the public excha between Moscow and Cairo two years	as resemble those made ange of recriminations

Relations between the Soviet and UAR governments, however, have been relatively good in recent months. Work on the Aswan Dam, for which Moscow has already extended credits totaling \$325,000,000, appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Soviet technicians are also working on a number of projects in the Egyptian region under a \$175,000,-000 credit granted in 1958. In early 1961 the USSR resumed large-scale deliveries of arms, including MIG-19 jet fighters.

Moscow has voiced approval when the UAR has taken a stand in opposition to the West or in support of some Soviet position. However, Soviet leaders have been irritated by such actions as Cairo's refusal to endorse Khrushchev's proposal for replacing the UN secretary general with a three-man secretariat and to give fuller support to the USSR at the UN during the Congo crisis.

The Nasir regime's attitude toward Arab Communists has been a consistent source of irritation to the USSR. Khrushchev's public criticism of arrests of Egyptian and Syrian Communists in late 1958 and early 1959 caused a deterioration of Soviet-UAR relations. Since then some features of Nasir's policies, including the continued suppression of Communists and the relatively slow pace of agrarian reform in the UAR, have been criticized from time to time, usually through international Communist journals and the Communist

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press in Lebanon. The current issue of the World Marxist Review, published in Prague, carries a strong attack by an anonymous author on the treatment of Communists in the UAR.

Nasir is sensitive to such criticisms and to the unfavorable comments made by Khalid Bakdash-head of the Syrian Communist party who is in exile in the bloc-about the growing domination of Syria by Egyptians since the merger in 1958.

The US Embassy in Cairo believes that the recent shift in UAR propaganda is also related to the deterioration of its foreign exchange balance and to the Nasir regime's desire to appear somewhat more friendly in anticipation of forthcoming negotiations for additional US assistance in the form of surplus agricultural products.		to the deterioration of its ne Nasir regime's desire to in anticipation of forth-

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Develo	pments	in Iran

The Shah told the American ambassador on 13 May that he felt charges of corruption among government officials were highly exaggerated but that arrests of those believed by the public to be corrupt were necessary to calm the situation. Those arrested would be tried, and if found guilty they would be punished. If they are found not guilty, the people's anger would be directed against the minister of justice, and not against the Crown.

The Shah noted that Prime Minister Amini now is relatively popular, chiefly because he has been out of public office for some time. He added that this popularity would diminish as Amini failed to meet the demands of the people now supporting him. The monarch maintained that the recent crisis could not have been solved if he had not had the power to dissolve parliament and appoint a new government.

In other developments, Tehran announced that Mohammad Derakhshesh, who led the teachers' strike which caused the collapse of the previous government, had been appointed minister of education. The teachers have been granted a 100-percent increase in salary. This success is likely to encourage demands and strike threats from other government workers.

The government has also announced the dismissal of ten Ministry of Justice officials, and the public prosecutor has stated that more than 100 electoral council members will be tried for election irregularities. Several thousand electoral council members participate in overseeing the elections in 154 constituencies. Cases of illegal interference with electoral procedures could probably be made against most of them.)

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Moroccan King lyovang to Consonate Personal Rules

The King's tours around the country, accompanied by most members of the cabinet, have resulted in an almost complete paralysis of government operations in Rabat. The US Embassy comments that the city is empty of any Moroccan at the policy or decision-making level

The US chargé, who was with Hassan's retinue during "triumphal tours" of Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, and Meknes, feels that the vast majority of simple, uneducated people support the idea of an absolute feudal monarch and fully accept Hassan in this role, but that politically conscious elements of all tendencies are increasingly irritated by the King's tactics. The political parties are particularly incensed over the King's delegation of the prime minister's powers last week to Ahmed Reda Guedira, chief of his personal cabinet. Moroccan Minister of Justice Torres said on 11 May that members of Hassan's entourage had cited the King's "great popularity" with the masses to help convince him that cheering throngs, rather than a constitution or political parties, held the key to the retention of royal power?

The police and security controls that Hassan reportedly intends to establish in Casablanca, Marrakech, Rabat, and Tangier will in effect constitute a state of military siege, with the right to assembly either abrogated or greatly curtailed. Apparently these measures, if taken, would be designed primarily to hobble the vigorous Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), whose strength—which was impressively manifested in a May Day parade in Casablanca—is regarded by the King as a dangerous political force. Such measures would require the loyalty of the army, and although Hassan has recently reassigned some officers suspected of anti-monarchial sentiments and taken other steps to maintain discipline, there continue to be reports of wide-scale, although so far ineffectual, disaffection within the army.

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Bonn Reported Planning Bundesrat Meeting in West Berlin

The East German news agency declared on 11 May that a Bundesrat meeting in West Berlin would be "provocative," reiterating the contention that "West German attempts to treat West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic grossly violate the existing unequivocal legal position and constitute a provocation" against the regime. Earlier, the East Germans charged that Mayor Brandt was attempting to foment a revolt in East Germany and they probably would claim that scheduling such a meeting on 16 June would be intended to spark a revolution.

Since July 1959, when Khrushchev attacked the meeting in Berlin of the West German national convention which elected West German President Luebke, the USSR has been attempting to make an international issue of the question of holding meetings of West German parliamentary bodies there. Annual meetings of either or both the Bundesrat and Bundestag had been held in West Berlin from 1950 to 1959 in order to foster the idea that the city is still Germany's national capital and to stress West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. These meetings have been increasingly under attack by the Communists, and last July Khrushchev threatened to "consider" signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany if Bonn held its annual Bundestag session in Berlin.

Following consultation with British, French, and American representatives, Chancellor Adenauer last fall decided against a Bundestag meeting in order to avoid doing anything which might aggravate tensions in the city. Berlin officials, however, have frequently expressed regret over the failure of the Bundestag to meet in Berlin last year and stress the view that it would be dangerous to let such an important link between Bonn and Berlin as legislative sessions in Berlin be discontinued.

Mayor Brandt is reported to have raised the issue of a meeting of only the upper house in Berlin with Franz Meyers, president of the Bundesrat, during the latter's appearance in Berlin on May Day. Meyers, who is now visiting the United States and scheduled to visit in Washington from 21 to 24 May,

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is legally empowered to convene the Bundesrat where he chooses, but he is not likely to do so if Adenauer strongly objects.

Adenauer faces a difficult decision on this question since failure to support a parliamentary meeting in Berlin could be exploited by the opposition Social Democrats in this fall's election campaign as showing a lack of sympathy for Berlin. On the other hand, he probably believes holding such a meeting would be beneficial to the Socialists by focusing attention on the city and on his opponent in the election—Mayor Willy Brandt.

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